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Abstract
Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin American
and Western European countries. Such institutional and organizational di¤erences might shape rms
operational environment in general and the type of competition in product and labor markets in particu-
lar. Contributing to the literature on estimating simultaneously product and labor market imperfections,
this paper quanties industry di¤erences in both types of imperfections using rm-level data in Chile
a non-OECD member under the considered time period and France. We rely on two extensions of
Halls econometric framework for estimating price-cost margins by nesting three labor market settings
(perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, e¢ cient bargaining and monopsony). Using an un-
balanced panel of 1,737 rms over the period 1996-2003 in Chile containing unique data on rm-level
output price indices and 14,270 rms over the period 1994-2001 in France, we rst classify 20 comparable
manufacturing industries in 6 distinct regimes that di¤er in the type of competition prevailing in product
and labor markets. We then investigate industry di¤erences in the estimated product and labor market
imperfections. Consistent with di¤erences in institutions and in the industrial relations system in the
two countries, we nd important regime di¤erences across the two countries. In addition, we observe
cross-country di¤erences in the levels of product and labor market imperfections within regimes.
JEL classication : C23, D21, J51, L13.
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1 Introduction
There is an abundant literature on production function estimation studying how rms convert inputs into
outputs and the e¢ ciency with which this occurs (see Syverson, 2011 for a survey). This literature as of
late has given increasing attention to possible biases that market imperfections particularly in the product
market could induce in production function and productivity estimates. There is a long tradition in ap-
plied industrial organization of estimating product market power (see De Loecker and Warzynski, 2012 for
references). While most economists believe that product and labor market imperfections almost surely exist
to one degree or another, only few have explicitly accounted for their joint inuence on production function
estimation at the micro level and existing analyses have been conned to OECD countries (see Dobbelaere
and Mairesse, 2013 for references).
Contributing to the econometric literature on estimating simultaneously product market and labor market
imperfections, this paper aims at identifying and quantifying industry di¤erences in both types of imperfec-
tions in Chile a non-OECD member under the considered time period1and France. In particular, we rst
examine cross-country variation in the prevalence of regimes characterizing the type of competition prevailing
in product and labor markets. We then investigate cross-industry heterogeneity in the degree of product and
labor market imperfections within regimes. Relying on an econometric method that only requires rm-level
data on production values, factor inputs and factor costs proves particularly useful to analyze important la-
bor issues in a comparative setting. For example, our analysis allows to distinguish industries predominantly
characterized by wage determination under trade unions from those predominantly typied by wage determi-
nation under oligopsonistic competition. As such, our analysis is capable of discerning whether either market
power on the supply side or market power on the demand side is predominantly responsible for introducing
allocative ine¢ ciencies through distorting factor prices.
The Chilean-French comparison is motivated by the inherent institutional, organizational and cultural dif-
ferences between the two countries. As part of the OECD accession process, competition law has been
strengthened and regulatory policies aimed at fostering market openness and competitionhave been im-
plemented in accordance with the OECDs Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance (2005)
in Chile during the last three decades (OECD, 2010). However, di¤erences remain in the regulatory settings
in Chile and France that our comparative study may conrm. For example, the OECD indicators of prod-
uct market anti-competitive regulations show that regulations are higher in Chile, in particular as concerns
administrative regulation which su¤ers from opacity and imposes burdens on startups (Wöl et al., 2010).
In Chile, social stratication and legislation tracing back to di¤erences based on race, social status and
ownership established during colonial timeshave historically modelled industrial relations and continue to
shape largely todays Chilean industrial relations system. Labor reforms, implemented during the 1990s,
have not been su¢ cient to move away from the legacy of dictatorship (Durán-Palma et al., 2005). Labor
legislation continues to facilitate dismissal, unionization remains contested and employment relations are still
based on authority, thereby promoting worker fear and insecurity (Rodríguez, 2010; Ronconi, 2012). Indeed,
comparing Chile to France, the OECD indicators of employment protection indicate that employment protec-
tion is signicantly higher in France, which is due to much stricter regulation on temporary contracts and to
1Chile became an OECD member on May 7, 2010 while the Chilean data in this study cover the period 1996-2003.
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additional requirements for collective dismissals (Venn, 2009). The industrial relations system in Chile also
explains why only 14% of employees are union members and only 24% of employees are covered by collective
bargaining agreements, which are mostly concluded at the enterprise level. In terms of union membership, the
French trade union movement is among the weakest in Europe, with an even lower proportion of employees in
unions than in Chile (8%). French trade unions are divided into a number of rival confederations, competing
for membership. However, union membership is not the only indicator of strength. Despite low membership
and apparent division, French trade unions have repeatedly shown that they are able to mobilize workers
in mass strikes and demonstrations to great e¤ect. In France, negotiations are mostly held at the industry
level which can be supplemented with bargaining agreements at the rm level. The fact that the govern-
ment often extends the terms of industry-level agreements to all employers explains the very high collective
bargaining coverage (95%). These institutional and organizational di¤erences might shape rmsoperational
environment in general and within our contextthe type of competition in product and labor markets in
particular. For example, given that industrial relations in France are characterized by a broadly regulated
system of wage bargaining typied by the dominance of industry-level wage bargaining and the existence and
widespread use of extension procedures for industry-level wage agreements and that French trade unions have
shown to be powerful, we expect the proportion of industries typied by wage determination under trade
unions to be larger in France compared to Chile.
Methodologically, our study implements the classication procedure developed in Dobbelaere and Mairesse
(2013). This procedure is based on two extensions of a microeconomic version of Halls (1988) framework
for estimating price-cost margins that take into account two polar extremes of types of imperfections in the
labor market that are both intuitively appealing and tractable: the e¢ cient bargaining model (McDonald
and Solow, 1981) being one of the two canonical rent-sharing models  that allocates market power to
employees through costs of ring, hiring and training, and the monopsony model (Manning, 2003) that
allocates market power to employers through search frictions or heterogeneous worker preferences for job
characteristics which generate upward sloping labor supply curves to individual rms (Booth, 2014). This
classication procedure uses econometric production functions as a tool for testing the competitiveness of
product and labor markets and evaluating their degree of imperfection. By considering two product market
settings (perfect competition (PC) and imperfect competition (IC)) and three labor market settings (perfect
competition or right-to-manage bargaining (PR), Nickell and Andrews, 1983, e¢ cient bargaining (EB) and
monopsony (MO)), it distinguishes six regimes characterizing the type of competition prevailing in product
and labor markets.
Given the selection of our two countries, our analysis is related to Benavente et al. (2009), Dobbelaere et
al. (2015) and Petrin and Sivadasan (2013). These studies are also based on the gap methodology which
essentially starts from the observation that any factors that create misallocation of resources can be thought
of as generating wedges in the rst-order conditions of rm optimization problems. Using a sample of
manufacturing rms in Belgium, Chile and France, Benavente et al. (2009) impose e¢ cient bargaining on
the data and estimate a Solow residual equation that gives estimates of average price-cost mark-up and
rent-sharing parameters at the manufacturing level. Using a sample of manufacturing rms in France, Japan
and the Netherlands, Dobbelaere et al. (2015) apply two distinct classication procedures which deviate
from the one in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013) to investigate di¤erences in revealed product and labor
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market settings at the industry level and to check the sensitivity of these settings to the choice of estimator.
Using a sample of manufacturing plants in Chile, Petrin and Sivadasan (2013) estimate the gaps between an
inputs marginal product and its cost to infer the value of lost output arising from allocative e¢ ciency at the
manufacturing level. Our contribution di¤ers from the aforementioned analyses in two respects. First, our
study is the rst to consistently compare the type and the degree of industry-level product and labor market
imperfections inferred from consistent estimation of rm-level production functions in a Latin American
country and a Western European country. Second, using a unique dataset containing rm-level output price
indices, our microeconomic production function estimates for Chile are not subject to the omitted output
price bias, as is often a major drawback in microeconometric studies of rm behavior.
Our empirical analysis is based on two unbalanced panels of manufacturing rms: 1,737 rms over the period
1996-2003 in Chile and 14,270 rms over the period 1994-2001 in France. Our analysis consists of two
parts. In the rst part, we classify 20 comparable manufacturing industries in each country according to
the six distinct regimes prevailing in these industries. We observe considerable di¤erences in the prevalent
product and labor market settings and hence in the competitiveness regimes in the 20 industries. We nd
that imperfect competition in the product market is much more frequent in both countries than perfect
competition and more so in France than in Chile, and that the most prevalent labor market setting is
perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in Chile while it is e¢ cient bargaining in France. In the
second part, we investigate within-regime industry di¤erences in the estimated product and labor market
imperfection parameters in each country. In addition to the important cross-country regime di¤erences that
our analysis reveals, we also nd di¤erences in the levels of market imperfections within these two regimes.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework. Section 3 presents the rm panel
data for Chile and France. Section 4 discusses the estimation method and the econometric implementation
of our procedure to classify industries in distinct regimes characterizing the type of competition prevailing
in product and labor markets. Section 5 reports the results of the classication procedure, investigating
how industries in both countries di¤er in the nature of product and labor market imperfections and assesses
industry di¤erences in the degree of market imperfections within each regime. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
This section presents the main ingredients of our extension of Halls (1988) framework for estimating price-
cost margins, which does not assume perfect competition in the labor market but considers three labor
market settings: perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, e¢ cient bargaining and monopsony. For
technical details, we refer to Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013).
We start from a production function Qit = itF (Nit; Mit; Kit),where i is a rm index, t a time index, N is
labor, M is material input and K is capital. it = Aei+ut+it , with i an unobserved rm-specic e¤ect, ut
a year-specic intercept and it a random component, is an index of technical change or truetotal factor
productivity. Denoting the logarithm of Qit, Nit, Mit, Kit and it by qit, nit, mit, kit and it respectively,
the logarithmic specication of the production function gives:
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qit = ("
Q
N )itnit + ("
Q
M )itmit + ("
Q
K)itkit + it (1)
where ("QJ )it (J = N;M;K) is the elasticity of output with respect to input factor J .
Firms operate under imperfect competition in the product market (IC). We allow for three labor mar-
ket settings (LMS): perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining (PR), e¢ cient bargaining (EB)
and monopsony (MO).2 We assume that material input and labor are variable factors. Short-run prot
maximization implies the following rst-order condition with respect to material input:
("QM )it = it (M )it (2)
where (M )it =
jitMit
PitQit
is the share of material costs in total revenue and it =
Pit
(CQ)it
refers to the mark-up
of output price Pit over marginal cost (CQ)it. Eq. (2) shows that the price-cost mark-up generates a wedge
between the output elasticity of materials and the revenue share of materials.
Depending on the prevalent LMS, short-run prot maximization implies the following rst-order condition
with respect to labor:
("QN )it = it (N )it if LMS = PR (3)
= it (N )it   itit [1  (N )it   (M )it] if LMS = EB (4)
=
it (N )it
it
if LMS = MO (5)
where (N )it = witNitPitQit is the share of labor costs in total revenue. it =
it
1 it represents the relative extent
of rent sharing, it 2 [0; 1] the absolute extent of rent sharing, it = ("
N
w )it
1+("Nw )it
and ("Nw )it 2 <+ the wage
elasticity of the labor supply. From the rst-order conditions with respect to material input and labor, we
can dene a parameter of joint market imperfections ( it) that is zero, positive or negative depending on the
labor market setting:
 it =
("QM )it
(M )it
  ("
Q
N )it
(N )it
(6)
= 0 if LMS = PR (7)
= itit

1  (N )it   (M )it
(N )it

> 0 if LMS = EB (8)
=  it
1
("Nw )it
< 0 if LMS = MO (9)
Eq. (6) clearly shows that our framework is based on the gap methodology. Indeed, from Eq. (6), it follows that
the gap between the output elasticities of labor and materials and their revenue shares are key to identication
of the product and labor market imperfection parameters. Intuitively, in a perfectly competitive labor market
or in a right-to-manage bargaining setting, the marginal employee receives a real wage that equals his/her
2Our framework does not allow to disentangle perfect competition in the labor market from right-to-manage bargaining.
In both settings, labor is unilaterally determined by the rm from prot maximization, i.e. the real wage equals the marginal
product of labor.
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marginal product. As such, the only source of discrepancy between the output elasticity of labor and the
share of labor costs in revenue is the price-cost mark-up, just like in the materials market, yielding the value
zero of the joint market imperfections parameter. In an e¢ cient bargaining setting, the marginal employee
gets a real wage that exceeds his/her marginal product since e¢ cient bargaining allocates inframarginal gains
across employees, yielding the positive value of the joint market imperfections parameter. In a monopsony
setting, on the other hand, the marginal employee obtains a real wage that is less than his/her marginal
product, yielding the negative value of the joint market imperfections parameter.
Once the relevant labor market setting is determined, the product and labor market imperfections parameters
are derived from the joint market imperfections parameter ( it): the price-cost mark-up and extent of rent-
sharing parameters (it and it, respectively) if the e¢ cient bargaining model prevails (see Eq. (8)) or the
price-cost mark-up and labor supply elasticity parameters
 
it and ("
N
w )it, respectively

if the monopsony
model prevails (see Eq. (9)). On the product market side, the price-cost mark-up measures the ability of
rms to charge prices above marginal costs. On the labor market side, the absolute extent of rent-sharing
parameter (it which is directly derived from it) measures the part of economic rents going to the workers
or the degree of workersbargaining power during worker-rm negotiations whereas the labor supply elasticity
parameter measures the degree of wage setting power that rms possess.
Assuming constant returns to scale, the capital elasticity can be expressed as:
("QK)it = 1  ("QN )it   ("QM )it (10)
Inserting Eqs. (2), (6) and (10) in Eq. (1) and rearranging terms gives:
qit = it [(N )it (nit   kit) + (M )it (mit   kit)] +  it(N )it (kit   nit) + it (11)
Eq. (11) is the basis for the empirical estimation of our parameters of interest.
3 Data description
Our modied production function framework only requires data on production values, factor inputs and
factor costs. This section presents the micro data in Chile and France.
The Chilean data are sourced from the ENIA (Encuesta Nacional Industrial Anual) survey collected annu-
ally by INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas). The French data are based on rm accounting information
from EAE (Enquête Annuelle dEntreprise, Service des Etudes et Statistiques Industrielles (SESSI)).
For both countries, our estimation sample is restricted to rms having at least four consecutive observations.
After some trimming on input shares in total revenue and input growth rates to eliminate outliers and anom-
alies, we end up with an unbalanced panel of 1,737 rms over the period 1996-2003 in Chile (CH) and 14,270
rms spanning the period 1994-2001 in France (FR). Table A.1 in Appendix gives the panel structure of the
estimation sample by country.
Output (Q) is dened as nominal sales divided by a rm-level price index based on the product-rm level
annex from ENIA in CH and current production deated by the two-digit producer price index in FR. Labor
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(N) refers to the average number of employees in each rm for each year in CH and FR. Material input
is dened as intermediate inputs consisting of raw materials, elaborated materials, fuels and electricity
deated by the two-digit intermediate inputs price index in CH and intermediate consumption deated by
the two-digit intermediate consumption price index in FR. The capital stock (K) is measured by the gross
bookvalue of xed assets at the beginning of the year in CH and FR. The shares of labor (N ) and material
input (M ) are constructed by dividing respectively the rm total labor cost and undeated intermediate
consumption by the rm undeated production and by taking the average of these ratios over adjacent years.
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations and quartile values of our main variables by country. The
average growth rate of real rm output is -0.4% per year in CH and 3.2% in FR.3 In CH, labor and
materials have decreased at an average annual growth rate of 1.8% and 1.9% respectively, while capital has
increased at an average annual growth rate of 4.3%. In FR, labor and materials have increased at an average
annual growth rate of 1.2% and 4.2% respectively, whereas capital has decreased at an average annual growth
rate of 0.2%. The Solow residual or the conventional measure of total factor productivity (TFP ) has been
stable over the considered period in each country. As expected for rm-level data, the dispersion of all these
variables is considerably large. For example, TFP growth is lower than -11.1% (-5.0%) for the rst quartile
of rms in CH (FR) and higher than 10.0% (6.3%) for the upper quartile in CH (FR).
<Insert Table 1 about here>
4 Econometric framework
4.1 Estimation method
We use econometric production functions as a tool for testing the competitiveness of product and labor
markets and for assessing their degree of imperfection, not only for estimating factor elasticities and total
factor productivity as has been common practice in the econometric literature on estimating microeconomic
production functions.
Since our study aims at (i) comparing regime di¤erences in terms of the type of competition prevailing in
product and labor markets across CH and FR and (ii) assessing within-regime industry di¤erences in the
estimated product and labor market imperfection parameters in each country, we estimate average parame-
ters:
qit =  [N (nit   kit) + M (mit   kit)] +  N (kit   nit) + ut + it (12)
with it = !it + it. Of the error components, !it represents unobserved productivity to the econometrician
but possible observed by the rm at t when input decisions are made (transmitted productivity shock), while
it captures all other sources of error or productivity that is not observed by the rm before making input
choices at t. Our method of retrieving product and labor market imperfection parameters from the gap
between the estimated average output elasticities of labor and materials and their average revenue shares
3The negative average real rm output growth rate in CH is due to a nancial crisis that hit the Chilean manufacturing
industries in 1998 and 1999. Real rm output decreased at an average growth rate of 2.1% and 7.3% in 1998 and 1999 respectively.
Taking out the crisis years would yield an average growth rate of real rm output of 1.5% per year.
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allows to wash out rm-level di¤erences in adjustment costs which are temporary in nature, i.e. related to
the business cycle.
The recent literature on production function estimation is dominated by two econometric approaches that
di¤er in handling endogeneity of inputs and unobserved productivity in models linear in parameters. In-
tuitively, both approaches di¤er in the way they put assumptions on the economic environment that allow
econometricians to exploit lagged input decisions as instruments for current input choices. The parametric
generalized method of moments (GMM ) approach relies on instrumental variables (IV ). The semiparametric
structural control function (CF ) approach uses observed variables and economic theory to invert out pro-
ductivity nonparametrically and hence to obtain an observable expression for productivity.4 Since we are
primarily interested in retrieving consistent production function coe¢ cients based on two di¤erent micro
datasets rather than an accurate measure of productivity, we judge the parametric GMM approach to be the
most appropriate.
In particular, we rely on a general approach to estimating error components models designed for panels with
few time periods and many individuals, covariates that are not strictly exogenous, unobserved heterogene-
ity, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals, developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and
Blundell and Bond (1998) (SYS-GMM estimator). This approach extends the standard (rst-di¤erenced)
GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) which eliminates unobserved rm-specic e¤ects by taking
rst di¤erencesby relying on a richer set of orthogonal conditions.5 The error components are an unobserved
xed e¤ect (i), a possibly autoregressive productivity shock (!it = !it 1 + it with jj < 1) and serially
uncorrelated measurement errors (it), with it; it  i:i:d. Consistent with our static theoretical framework,
we estimate the restricted version of the Blundell-Bond model and only consider idiosyncratic productivity
shocks (imposing  = 0). We apply the two-step GMM estimator which is asymptotically more e¢ cient
than the one-step GMM estimator and which is robust to whatever patterns of heteroskedasticity and cross-
correlation. We use a nite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix developed by Windmeijer
(2005). The validity of GMM crucially hinges on the assumption that the instruments are exogenous. We
report both the Sargan and Hansen test statistics for the joint validity of the overidentifying restrictions. We
build sets of instruments following the Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988)-approach which avoids the standard two-stage
least squares trade-o¤ between instrument lag depth and sample depth by including separate instruments for
each time period and substituting zeros for missing observations. However, the SYS-GMM estimator might
generate moment conditions prolically with the instrument count quadratic in the time dimension of the
panel. To avoid instrument proliferation, we only use 2- and 3-year lags of the instrumented variables as
instruments in the rst-di¤erenced equation and the 1-year lag of the rst-di¤erenced instrumented variables
as instruments in the original equation. In addition to the Hansen test evaluating the entire set of overiden-
tifying restrictions/instruments, we provide di¤erence-in-Hansen statistics to test the validity of subsets of
instruments.
4Eberhardt and Helmers (2010) survey the most popular parametric and semiparametric estimators dealing with the trans-
mission bias for Cobb-Douglas production functions.
5The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator assumes that the rst di¤erences of the instrumental variables are uncorrelated
with the xed e¤ects, which allows the introduction of more instruments which might improve e¢ ciency dramatically.
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Besides the simultaneity bias, other important biases that emerge when estimating microeconomic production
functions are (i) the output price bias, (ii) the bias arising from the unobserved allocation of inputs across
products within multi-product rms and (iii) the bias arising from unobserved input prices with the source
of input price variation across rms being quality di¤erentiation (referred to as the input price bias) (De
Loecker et al., 2012).6 If rms face downward-sloping demands, a negative correlation might arise between
rm-level price deviations (from an average price index) and input choices. As a result, the output price bias
could produce downwardly biased output elasticity estimates. As shown by De Loecker and Goldberg (2014),
controlling for output price variation but ignoring input price variation could lead to downwardly biased (or
even negative) output elasticity estimates. As the output price bias and the input price bias tend to work in
opposite directions, not controlling for either output price or input price variation produces less biased output
elasticity estimates. Realizing that our data comprise a set of industries characterized by substantial product
di¤erentiation and acknowledging that di¤erentiated products require di¤erentiated inputs, we ideally need
to control for both output price and input price variation. Having information on rm-level output prices
but lacking information on rm-level input prices for CH, hence, estimating a quantity production function
that ignores input price variation, our output elasticity estimates could be downwardly biased. Lacking
information on rm-level output prices and input prices for FR, our output elasticity estimates su¤er from
both the output price bias and the input price bias, with the net bias likely to be small.
In addition to the biases discussed so far, the presence of adjustment costs in inputs could also be a source
of bias in our estimates. In particular, assuming that labor and materials are variable input factors free of
adjustment costs (i.e. decided at production time when the productivity component !it is observed by the
rm, but not by the econometrician) could generate an upward bias in the respective production function
coe¢ cients. However, by estimating average production function coe¢ cients, we argue that this e¤ect should
be limited. Note that although our estimation method might wash out rm-level di¤erences in adjustment
costs which are temporary in nature, country- and industry-level di¤erences in adjustment costs which are
permanent/structural in nature might still remain.
4.2 Classication procedure
In each country, we consider 20 comparable industries making up our estimation sample. This decomposition
is detailed enough for our purpose and ensures that each industry contains a su¢ cient number of observations
(minimum: 104 observations for Other food products in CH and 929 for Rubber products in FR). Table
A.2 in Appendix presents the industry repartition of the estimation sample and the number of rms and the
number of observations by industry and country. For each industry j 2 f1; : : : ; 20g, we estimate a standard
Cobb-Douglas production function [Eq. (12)] using the SYS-GMM estimator.
The sign and statistical signicance of the estimated industry-specic joint market imperfections parameterb j determines the regime characterizing the type of competition prevailing in the product and the labor
market. A priori, 6 distinct regimes are possible: (1 ) perfect competition in the product market (PC) and
6Additional methodological issues that arise when estimating microeconomic production functions are selection
bias/endogeneity of attrition and measurement error. To deal with these methodological issues, several estimators have been
proposed (see Dobbelaere et al., 2015 for a discussion).
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perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market (PR), (2 ) imperfect competition in
the product market (IC) and perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market (PR),
(3 ) perfect competition in the product market (PC) and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market (EB), (4 )
imperfect competition in the product market (IC) and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market (EB), (5 )
perfect competition in the product market (PC) and monopsony in the labor market (MO) and (6 ) imperfect
competition in the product market (IC) and monopsony in the labor market (MO). We denote the 6 possible
regimes by R 2 < = fPC-PR; IC-PR;PC-EB; IC-EB;PC-MO; IC-MOg.
We apply the classication procedure introduced in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013) to classify our manufac-
turing industries in R 2 <. This classication procedure consists of two stages. In the rst stage, we perform
an F -test (explicit joint test) of the joint hypothesisH0 :

j   1 =
("QM)j
(M )j
  1

=

 j =
("QM)j
(M )j
  ("
Q
N)j
(N )j

= 0,
where the alternative is that at least one of the parameters (the industry-specic price-cost mark-up j minus
1, or the industry-specic joint market imperfections parameter  j) does not equal zero. In other words,
if H0 is not rejected, that particular industry is characterized by the PC-PR-regime and if H0 is rejected,
it is not. Having selected the industries typied by the PC-PR-regime, we classify in the second stage of
the procedure the remaining industries in one of the ve other regimes by conducting two separate t-tests.
For example, if our null hypothesis is IC-EB, we perform the following implicit joint test (or induced test)
(Savin, 1984): H10 :
 
j   1

> 0 and H20 :  j > 0. The separate t-tests reject that the IC-EB-regime
applies if either H10 or H20 is rejected. Since it is generally accepted that market imperfections are the norm,
not the exception, we put a priori less weight on the PC-PR-regime by using the 10% statistical signicance
level instead of the conventional 5% level. More specically, when testing H0 :
 
j   1

=  j = 0 in the
rst stage of the classication procedure, we reject H0 at the 10% level if the two-tailed p-value is less than
0.10. When testing H10 :
 
j   1

= 0 against H1a :
 
j   1

> 0 in the second stage of the classication
procedure, we reject H10 at the 10% level if
 
j   1

> 0, i.e. corresponding to a two-tailed p-value less than
0.20. Likewise, for the test of  j > 0 or  j < 0, we reject H20 :  j = 0 at the 10% level if the two-tailed
p-value is less than 0.10.
5 Di¤erences in the nature and the degree of market imperfections
Recall that the purpose of our study is twofold. First, analyzing whether there exist di¤erences in regimes
characterizing the type of competition prevailing in product and labor markets between CH and FR and
checking whether our methodology allows to capture country-level di¤erences in terms of institutions and the
industrial relations system. This analysis is performed by implementing our classication procedure whose
results are discussed in Section 5.1. Second, examining within-regime industry di¤erences by (i) checking
whether the observed cross-country regime di¤erences are driven by important cross-country di¤erences in
the composition of industries making up the regime and (ii) investigating cross-industry heterogeneity in
the degree of product and labor market imperfections within regimes. These results are discussed in Section
5.2. As such, Section 5.1 and the rst part of Section 5.2 focuses on a cross-country comparison whilst the
remainder of Section 5.2 has a cross-industry focus.
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5.1 Prevalent regimes
Table 2 summarizes the resulting industry classication.7 Columns 5 (CH) and 8 (FR) in Table A.2 in
Appendix provide details on the specic industries belonging to each regime. Focusing on the product
market side, 60% of the industries comprising 87% of the rms are typied by imperfect competition in CH
whilst this holds for all industries in FR. On the labor market side, 80% of the industries comprising 47% of
the rms are characterized by perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining and 20% of the industries
comprising 53% of the rms by e¢ cient bargaining in CH. In FR, 60% of the industries comprising 73% of
the rms are typied by e¢ cient bargaining and 40% of the industries comprising 27% of the rms by perfect
competition or right-to-manage bargaining. Hence, none of the industries is characterized by monopsony.
Taken together, the prevalent regimes in Chile are IC-PR, PC-PR and IC-EB:
 IC-PR-regime: 40% of the industries comprising 34% of the rms,
 PC-PR-regime: 40% of the industries comprising 12% of the rms and
 IC-EB-regime: 20% of the industries comprising 53% of the rms.
In France, the prevalent regimes are IC-EB and IC-PR:
 IC-EB-regime: 60% of the industries comprising 73% of the rms and
 IC-PR-regime: 40% of the industries comprising 27% of the rms.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Summing up, our methodology allows to capture to some extent country-level institutional di¤erences
in terms of regulatory policy and the industrial relations system, which are structural in nature. We nd
that (i) imperfect competition in the product market is much more frequent in both countries than perfect
competition and more so in FR than in CH and (ii) the most prevalent labor market setting is perfect
competition or right-to-manage bargaining in CH and e¢ cient bargaining in FR. As such, the dominant
regime is one of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect competition or right-to-manage
bargaining in the labor market in CH and one of imperfect competition in the product market and e¢ cient
bargaining in the labor market in FR.8
7Note that our procedure classies industries in di¤erent regimes, implying that our interpretation of e.g. IC-EB-industries
is that the representative rm is characterized by the same regime as the industry to which it belongs. Although we might
expect that a majority of rms within an industry belongs to the same regime as that particular industry, regime di¤erences
across rms within a given industry are important, as we see for France in our previous work (Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2013).
8To investigate whether di¤erences in the industry classication between CH and FR are driven by di¤erences in the choice
of output price deator, we compared the industry classication for CH using the rm-level price index to deate nominal sales
with the one using the same deator as FR, i.e. the 2-digit industry price index. These results which are not reported but
available upon requestreveal minor di¤erences in terms of industry classication. In particular, when using the 2-digit industry
price index, we observe (i) a slight decrease in the proportion of industries characterized by PC in the product market (from
40% to 35%), (ii) a relatively small decrease in the proportion of industries characterized by PR in the labor market (from 80%
to 70%), which translates into (iii) a relatively small increase in the proportion of industries characterized by EB (from 20% to
30%). From this sensitivity check, we conclude that the important regime di¤erences between CH and FR are conrmed when
using the 2-digit industry price index for CH: the most prevalent labor market setting is PR in CH while it is EB in FR. As
such, IC-PR is the dominant regime in CH while IC-EB is the dominant regime in FR.
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5.2 Within-regime industry di¤erences
Are the cross-country regime di¤erences that we conrmed in the previous section driven by cross-country
di¤erences in the composition of industries making up the regimes? To answer that question, we compare
the relevant regime of each industry j 2 f1; : : : ; 20g across both countries (see columns 5 and 8 in Table A.2
in Appendix). Conrming within-regime industry heterogeneity across both countries, we observe that 65%
(13 out of 20) of the manufacturing industries are characterized by a di¤erent regime. The four common
IC-PR-industries are Textile, Leather goods and footwear, Rubber products, and Mineral products. The
three common IC-EB-industries are Clothing and skin goods, Furniture, and Metal products and processing.
So far, we have concentrated on the identication of the type of competition prevailing in product and labor
markets. As the degree of market failures is likely to vary across countries and across industries, we now focus
on the quantication of market power in product and labor markets. This enables us to evaluate to which
degree actual product and labor markets deviate from their perfectly competitive or economically e¢ cient
counterparts. From Section 2, it is clear that once the regime is determined, the product and labor market
imperfections parameters are derived from the estimated joint market imperfections parameter b j . Table 3
presents the industry mean and the industry quartile values of the SYS-GMM results within the prevalent
regimes in each country. The left part of Table 3 reports the estimated joint market imperfections parameter
and the right part the relevant product and labor market imperfection parameters, i.e. the price-cost mark-
up within PC-PR and IC-PR, and the price-cost mark-up and the extent of rent sharing within IC-EB.
The standard errors () of bj , bj and bj are computed using the Delta method (Wooldridge, 2002).9 All
industry-specic estimates are presented in Table A.3 in Appendix. In addition to the parameters reported
in Table 3, Table A.3 also reports the computed factor shares and the output elasticity estimates. In Table
A.3, industries within the PC-PR- and IC-PR-regimes are ranked according to bj and industries within the
IC-EB-regime according to bj .
Let us focus the discussion on the primary parameters within each regime in CH and FR respectively. The
prevalent regimes in CH are IC-PR (40% of industries/34% of rms), PC-PR (40% of industries/12% of
rms) and IC-EB (20% of industries/53% of rms).
 Within regime R = IC-PR in CH, bj is lower than 1.199 for industries in the rst quartile and higher
than 1.592 for industries in the upper quartile. The median value of bj is estimated at 1.397.
 Within regime R = PC-PR in CH, bj is lower than 1.007 for industries in the rst quartile and higher
than 1.329 for industries in the third quartile. The median value of bj is estimated at 1.198.
 Within R = IC-EB in CH, b j is lower than 0.800 for industries in the rst quartile and higher than
1.115 for industries in the third quartile. The corresponding bj is lower than 1.403 for the rst quartile
9Dropping subscript j, b, b and b are derived as follows: b = b"QM
M
; b = b"QN b"QM NM b"Q
M
M
(N+M 1)
and
b = b
1+b . Their respective standard errors are computed as:  b2 = 1(M )2

b"Q
M
2
;
 
b2 =

M
N+M 1
2 b"QM2 b"Q
N
!2
 2b"Q
N
b"Q
M
 
b"Q;
N
b"Q
M
!
+
b"Q
N
2 
b"Q
N
!2
b"Q
M
4 and b2 = (b)2(1+b)4 .
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of industries and higher than 1.633 for the top quartile. The corresponding bj is estimated to be lower
than 0.237 for industries in the rst quartile and higher than 0.306 for industries in the upper quartile.
The median values of b j , bj and bj are estimated at 0.904, 1.543 and 0.287 respectively.
The prevalent regimes in FR are IC-EB (60% of industries/73% of rms) and IC-PR (40% of industries/27%
of rms).
 Within R = IC-EB in FR, b j is lower than 0.473 for industries in the rst quartile and higher than
0.712 for industries in the third quartile. The corresponding bj is lower than 1.344 for the rst quartile
of industries and higher than 1.471 for the top quartile. The corresponding bj is estimated to be lower
than 0.383 for industries in the rst quartile and higher than 0.489 for industries in the upper quartile.
The median values of b j , bj and bj are estimated at 0.651, 1.378 and 0.431 respectively.
 Within regime R = IC-PR in FR, bj is lower than 1.244 for industries in the rst quartile and higher
than 1.427 for industries in the upper quartile. The median value of bj is estimated at 1.306.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
Given that we have provided evidence of compositional variation in regimes across countries, we expect a priori
to observe di¤erences in the degree of market imperfection parameters across countries within a particular
regime. Conrming this expectation for the IC-EB-regime, the median price-cost mark-up is estimated to
be signicantly higher in CH (1.543 compared to 1.378 in FR) whilst the median absolute extent of rent
sharing is estimated to be signicantly higher in FR (0.431 compared to 0.287 in CH). However, we do
not detect a statistically signicant cross-country di¤erence in the median product imperfection parameter
within the IC-PR-regime.
Existing empirical studies relying on either the same or a simplied version of our theoretical model
have found that product and labor market imperfections are likely to go hand in hand by documenting a
positive correlation between the estimated price-cost mark-up and the estimated extent of rent sharing in
the cross-section dimension (see Dobbelaere, 2004; Boulhol et al., 2011 and Dobbelaere and Mairesse, 2013).
Corroborative evidence is provided by several OECD studies indicating that (i) there is a positive correlation
between product market regulation and industry wage mark-ups (OECD, 2001) and (ii) product and labor
market deregulations are correlated across countries (e.g. Brandt et al., 2005). Supporting evidence is also
given by Ebell and Haefke (2006) who argue that the strong decline in coverage and unionization in the UK
and the US might have been a direct consequence of product market reforms of the early 1980s and by Boulhol
(2009) who develops a theoretical model formalizing the idea that trade and capital market liberalization
put pressure on labor market institutions leading to deregulation. Do we observe any relationship between
product and labor imperfections in the two countries under consideration? To get a rst insight, Table A.4 in
Appendix reports correlations between product and labor market imperfection parameters for all industries
and for the IC-EB-regime in each of the two countries. Two types of correlations between bj and bj / bj andbj are reported: Spearmans rank correlation coe¢ cients and biweight midcorrelation coe¢ cients. The latter,
which is based on Wilcox (2005), gives a correlation that is less sensitive to outliers and therefore more robust.
Considering all industries, we observe a signicant and strong correlation (of more than 0.6) between eitherbj and bj or bj and bj in both CH and FR. This holds for both types of correlation coe¢ cients. Within
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the IC-EB-regime, we nd a signicant robust correlation of 0.48 (0.77) between bj and bj in CH (FR). A
visual representation is given in Graphs 1-2. Each graph corresponds to one country. The rst two panels in
each graph focus on all industries, whereas the last panel in each graph focuses on the IC-EB-regime. The
dashed lines denote the median values of the product and labor market imperfection parameters.
<Insert Graphs 1-2 about here>
6 Conclusion
This paper starts from the belief that product and labor markets are intrinsically characterized by imperfec-
tions and by the fact that variable input factorsestimated marginal products are not equal to their measured
payments. There are a number of reasons why the latter discrepancy could exist. Paramount among these
are economic factors like imperfections in product and/or factor markets, variable factor utilization, factor
adjustment costs and measurement issues. Focusing on the former, this paper investigates how di¤erent
manufacturing industries in Chile and France are in their factor shares, in their marginal products and in
their imperfections in the product and labor markets in which they operate. Allowing for three labor market
settings (perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining, e¢ cient bargaining and monopsony), we rely on
two extensions of Halls econometric framework for estimating price-cost margins. Using an unbalanced panel
of 1,737 rms over the period 1996-2003 in Chile and 14,270 rms over the period 1994-2001 in France, we
rst determine the prevalent product market and labor market settings, and hence the prevalent regime, in
20 comparable manufacturing industries. We then investigate industry di¤erences in the estimated product
and labor market imperfection parameters within the prevalent regimes in each country.
Institutions, social norms and the nature of industrial relations vary greatly between Latin American countries
and Western European countries. In Chile, practices continue to favor employers as evidenced by the easiness
with which employers can hire or dismiss employees and by employersdecision-making power during the
process of collective bargaining, and unionization remains contested. In contrast, industrial relations in France
are characterized by a broadly regulated system of wage bargaining typied by the dominance of industry-
level wage bargaining and the widespread use of extension procedures for industry-level wage agreements.
These di¤erences in the industrial relations system in the two countries are reected in our results. Indeed,
our analysis provides evidence of important regime di¤erences at the detailed industry level across Chile and
France. The dominant regime in Chile is one of imperfect competition in the product market and perfect
competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market (IC-PR). The median price-cost mark-up in
the IC-PR-industries is about 1.40. In France, the dominant regime is imperfect competition in the product
market and e¢ cient bargaining in the labor market (IC-EB). The median price-cost mark-up and absolute
extent of rent-sharing parameters in the IC-EB-industries are about 1.38 and 0.43 respectively. Our study
also reveals cross-country di¤erences in the levels of product and labor market imperfections within regimes.
Within the IC-EB-regime, product market imperfections are estimated to be the highest in Chile while labor
market imperfections are estimated to the highest in France.
The main message of our results is that despite the implementation of regulatory policies aimed at increasing
competition in Chile and France, actual product and labor markets still deviate considerably from their
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economically e¢ cient counterparts. Given that the recent misallocation literature has now well established
the important role of misallocation of resources across productive units in explaining aggregate outcomes,
this nding together with our evidence of cross-country cross-industry heterogeneity in terms of allocative
e¢ ciency might explain to some extent the sizeable variation in total factor productivity across our two
countries and selected industries.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by country
CHILE (1996-2003)
Variables Mean Sd. Q1 Q2 Q3 N
Real rm output growth rate qit -0.004 0.216 -0.123 -0.004 0.120 9,960
Labor growth rate nit -0.018 0.160 -0.095 0.000 0.057 9,960
Materials growth rate mit -0.019 0.281 -0.185 -0.016 0.146 9,960
Capital growth rate kit 0.043 0.101 0.000 0.006 0.052 9,960
(N )j (nit  kit) + (M )j (mit  kit) -0.042 0.155 -0.132 -0.038 0.052 9,960
(N )j (kit  nit) 0.011 0.030 -0.004 0.008 0.025 9,960
SRit -0.006 0.175 -0.111 -0.005 0.100 9,960
Labor share in nominal output (N )i 0.172 0.080 0.114 0.164 0.216 11,697
Materials share in nominal output (M )i 0.497 0.142 0.390 0.497 0.597 11,697
1  (N )i   (M )i 0.330 0.118 0.245 0.326 0.415 11,697
FRANCE (1994-2001)
Variables Mean Sd. Q1 Q2 Q3 N
Real rm output growth rate qit 0.032 0.153 -0.051 0.030 0.114 98,322
Labor growth rate nit 0.012 0.130 -0.039 0.000 0.064 98,322
Materials growth rate mit 0.042 0.191 -0.059 0.038 0.141 98,322
Capital growth rate kit -0.002 0.161 -0.077 -0.021 0.066 98,322
(N )j (nit  kit) + (M )j (mit  kit) 0.027 0.155 -0.056 0.028 0.110 98,322
(N )j (kit  nit) -0.005 0.057 -0.031 -0.006 0.022 98,322
SRit 0.006 0.100 -0.050 0.007 0.063 98,322
Labor share in nominal output (N )i 0.311 0.132 0.216 0.298 0.390 99,839
Materials share in nominal output (M )i 0.517 0.143 0.427 0.523 0.617 99,839
1  (N )i   (M )i 0.171 0.096 0.103 0.147 0.211 99,839
Note: SRit = qit   (N )j nit   (M )j mit   [1  (N )j   (M )j ]kit.
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Table 2: Industry classication by country
# ind.
prop. of ind. (%)
prop. of rms (%)
LABOR MARKET SETTING
PRODUCT MARKET PR EB MO
SETTING CH FR CH FR CH FR CH FR
PC
8
40:0
12:5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
40:0
12:5
0
0
0
IC
8
40:0
34:5
8
40:0
27:0
4
20:0
52:9
12
60:0
73:0
0
0
0
0
0
0
12
60:0
87:4
20
100
100
16
80:0
47:0
8
40:0
27:0
4
20:0
52:9
12
60:0
73:0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
100
100
20
100
100
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Table 3: Industry-specic joint market imperfections parameter b j , and corresponding price-cost mark-up bj
and absolute extent of rent sharing bj by country
CHILE
Regime R = IC-PR
[40% of industries, 34% of rms]
b j bj
Industry mean 0.422 (0.864) 1.402 (0.192)
Industry Q1 0.127 (0.564) 1.199 (0.112)
Industry Q2 0.567 (0.660) 1.397 (0.148)
Industry Q3 0.728 (0.856) 1.592 (0.274)
Regime R = PC-PR
[40% of industries, 12% of rms]
b j bj
Industry mean -0.311 (1.823) 1.137 (0.382)
Industry Q1 -0.964 (0.942) 1.007 (0.283)
Industry Q2 -0.458 (1.576) 1.198 (0.384)
Industry Q3 0.334 (2.680) 1.329 (0.489)
Regime R = IC-EB
[20% of industries, 53% of rms]
b j bj bj bj
Industry mean 0.957 (0.476) 1.518 (0.138) 0.378 (0.158) 0.271 (0.082)
Industry Q1 0.800 (0.343) 1.403 (0.107) 0.315 (0.117) 0.237 (0.066)
Industry Q2 0.904 (0.409) 1.543 (0.134) 0.403 (0.149) 0.287 (0.081)
Industry Q3 1.115 (0.609) 1.633 (0.169) 0.441 (0.199) 0.306 (0.098)
FRANCE
Regime R = IC-EB
[60% of industries, 73% of rms]
b j bj bj bj
Industry mean 0.602 (0.153) 1.403 (0.057) 0.812 (0.179) 0.439 (0.057)
Industry Q1 0.473 (0.124) 1.344 (0.046) 0.622 (0.139) 0.383 (0.041)
Industry Q2 0.651 (0.149) 1.378 (0.058) 0.756 (0.169) 0.431 (0.054)
Industry Q3 0.712 (0.193) 1.471 (0.069) 0.959 (0.218) 0.489 (0.066)
Regime R = IC-PR
[40% of industries, 27% of rms]
b j bj
Industry mean 0.413 (0.263) 1.333 (0.087)
Industry Q1 0.127 (0.164) 1.244 (0.056)
Industry Q2 0.412 (0.259) 1.306 (0.090)
Industry Q3 0.701 (0.303) 1.427 (0.120)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Detailed information on the industry-specic estimates
is presented in Table A.3 in Appendix.
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Graph 1: Product and labor market imperfection parameters in Chile
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Graph 2: Product and labor market imperfection parameters in France
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Appendix: Statistical annex
Table A.1: Panel structure: Number of observations per rm by country
CHILE FRANCE
# participationsa) # obs. % # rms % # obs. % # rms %
4 884 7.56 221 12.72 4,164 4.17 1,041 7.30
5 770 6.58 154 8.87 7,150 7.16 1,430 10.02
6 1,278 10.93 213 12.26 12,804 12.82 2,134 14.95
7 2,989 25.55 427 24.58 11,193 11.21 1,599 11.21
8 5,776 49.38 722 41.57 64,528 64.63 8,066 56.52
Total 11,697 100.0 1,737 100.0 99,839 100.0 14,270 100.0
Note: a) Median number of observations per rm: 7 [CH] and 8 [FR].
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Table A.2: Industry repartition by country
CHILE FRANCE
Ind. j Name Code - CIIUa)
# Firms
(# Obs.)
Regime R Code - NES 114b)
# Firms
(# Obs.)
Regime R
1 Food 311 580 (3,926) IC-EB B01-B02, B04 746 (5,211) IC-PR
2 Other food products 312 16 (104) PC-PR B05-B06 800 (5,492) IC-PR
3 Beverages 313 17 (121) PC-PR B03 145 (997) IC-PR
4 Textile 321 120 (830) IC-PR F21-F32 710 (4,963) IC-PR
5 Clothing and skin goods 322 108 (717) IC-EB C11 606 (3,980) IC-EB
6 Leather goods and footwear 323-324 72 (477) IC-PR C12 244 (1,681) IC-PR
7 Wooden products 331 110 (735) IC-PR F31 665 (4,679) IC-EB
8 Furniture 332 60 (389) IC-EB C41 448 (3,224) IC-EB
9 Paper, paper products 341 37 (237) PC-PR F32-F33 429 (3,017) IC-PR
10 Publishing, (re)printing 342 35 (222) PC-PR C20 990 (6,715) IC-EB
11 Chemical products 351-352, 354 70 (495) IC-PR C31-C32, F41-F43 675 (4,745) IC-EB
12 Rubber products 355 27 (189) IC-PR F45 129 (929) IC-PR
13 Plastics processing 356 106 (741) IC-PR F46 914 (6,432) IC-EB
14 Mineral products 361-362, 369 59 (377) IC-PR F13-F14 644 (4,572) IC-PR
15 Metallurgy 371-372 18 (130) PC-PR F51-F53 321 (2,328) IC-EB
16 Metal products, metal processing 381 171 (1,132) IC-EB E21-E22, F54-F56 2,803 (19,794) IC-EB
17 Machinery 382 37 (255) PC-PR E24-E28 966 (6,727) IC-EB
18 Electrical machinery, electrical equipment 383 22 (144) PC-PR C44-C46, E32-E33, F61-F62 798 (5,641) IC-EB
19 Transport equipment 384 36 (239) PC-PR D01-D02, E11-E13 691 (4,927) IC-EB
20 Other manufacturing industries 385, 390 36 (237) IC-PR C42-C43, E34-E35 546 (3,785) IC-EB
Notes: a) CIIU: Chilean industrial classication, equivalent to the International Standard Industry Classication (ISIC), Rev. 2.
b) NES 114: French industrial classication, Nomenclature Economique de Synthèse - Niveau 3.
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Table A.3: Industry-specic input shares (J )j (J = N;M;K), output elasticities
b"QJ j , joint market imperfections parameter b j ,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up bj and absolute extent of rent sharing bj by country
CHILE
Regime R = IC-PR [40% of industries, 34% of rms]
Ind. j (N )j (M )j (K )j (b"QN )j (b"QM )j (b"QK )j b j bj Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
1 3 0 .1 6 4 0 .5 1 3 0 .3 2 3 0 .2 5 1 ( 0 .0 4 2 ) 0 .6 1 2 ( 0 .0 5 9 ) 0 .1 3 7 ( 0 .0 3 8 ) - 0 .3 4 0 ( 0 .3 5 1 ) 1 .1 9 4 ( 0 .1 1 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 7 0 0 .7 1 6 0 .2 6 8 0 .1 5 6 - 4 .6 5 0 .6 8
1 1 0 .1 4 8 0 .4 8 9 0 .3 6 2 0 .2 0 0 ( 0 .0 7 0 ) 0 .5 8 5 ( 0 .0 4 8 ) 0 .2 1 5 ( 0 .0 6 1 ) - 0 .1 5 6 ( 0 .5 3 0 ) 1 .1 9 5 ( 0 .0 9 8 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .6 3 7 0 .1 5 7 0 .8 1 1 0 .9 0 6 - 3 .1 6 - 0 .3 0
7 0 .1 4 7 0 .5 4 7 0 .3 0 6 0 .0 9 2 ( 0 .0 7 9 ) 0 .6 5 8 ( 0 .0 6 0 ) 0 .2 5 1 ( 0 .0 7 1 ) 0 .5 7 7 ( 0 .5 9 8 ) 1 .2 0 3 ( 0 .1 0 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 5 5 0 .2 4 7 0 .6 3 6 0 .5 7 3 - 3 .9 0 0 .8 1
6 0 .1 7 8 0 .5 6 0 0 .2 6 3 0 .1 5 9 ( 0 .1 2 8 ) 0 .7 3 2 ( 0 .0 8 1 ) 0 .1 0 9 ( 0 .1 0 4 ) 0 .4 1 0 ( 0 .8 1 5 ) 1 .3 0 7 ( 0 .1 4 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .6 4 9 0 .9 6 3 0 .9 6 3 0 .9 9 5 - 3 .9 9 - 0 .5 0
1 4 0 .2 2 5 0 .4 2 6 0 .3 5 0 0 .1 3 8 ( 0 .0 9 9 ) 0 .6 3 3 ( 0 .0 8 1 ) 0 .2 2 9 ( 0 .0 6 5 ) 0 .8 7 2 ( 0 .5 9 9 ) 1 .4 8 7 ( 0 .1 9 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .8 6 9 0 .9 9 6 0 .9 9 8 1 .0 0 0 - 1 .9 3 - 0 .7 3
1 2 0 .2 0 0 0 .4 4 6 0 .3 5 4 0 .1 5 9 ( 0 .4 5 2 ) 0 .6 9 4 ( 0 .1 6 6 ) 0 .1 4 7 ( 0 .4 3 3 ) 0 .7 6 0 ( 2 .3 9 8 ) 1 .5 5 6 ( 0 .3 7 1 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 0 .9 9 8 - 2 .5 9 0 .3 5
2 0 0 .2 0 1 0 .3 9 9 0 .4 0 0 0 .2 1 5 ( 0 .1 5 3 ) 0 .6 4 9 ( 0 .1 4 3 ) 0 .1 3 6 ( 0 .1 9 1 ) 0 .5 5 6 ( 0 .8 9 7 ) 1 .6 2 8 ( 0 .3 5 7 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 1 .6 5 - 1 .1 7
4 0 .1 6 9 0 .5 1 3 0 .3 1 8 0 .1 6 1 ( 0 .1 0 7 ) 0 .8 4 7 ( 0 .0 7 8 ) - 0 .0 0 8 ( 0 .0 9 5 ) 0 .6 9 6 ( 0 .7 2 2 ) 1 .6 5 0 ( 0 .1 5 2 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .2 1 2 0 .0 7 8 0 .1 4 2 0 .1 3 1 - 4 .6 5 0 .5 4
Regime R = PC-PR [40% of industries, 12% of rms]
Ind. j (N )j (M )j (K )j (b"QN )j (b"QM )j (b"QK )j b j bj Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
3 0 .1 0 8 0 .4 7 9 0 .4 1 3 0 .3 0 6 ( 0 .3 6 8 ) 0 .2 7 7 ( 0 .2 4 4 ) 0 .4 1 7 ( 0 .3 6 8 ) - 2 .2 4 9 ( 3 .6 0 2 ) 0 .5 7 8 ( 0 .5 1 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 1 .9 5 1 .0 4
1 8 0 .1 9 6 0 .4 5 8 0 .3 4 6 0 .3 1 3 ( 0 .2 3 5 ) 0 .4 0 1 ( 0 .2 0 1 ) 0 .2 8 6 ( 0 .2 3 5 ) - 0 .7 2 2 ( 1 .4 5 0 ) 0 .8 7 5 ( 0 .4 3 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 1 .4 5 - 0 .0 8
9 0 .1 5 0 0 .5 0 6 0 .3 4 4 0 .0 9 2 ( 0 .0 7 9 ) 0 .5 7 7 ( 0 .1 1 8 ) 0 .3 3 1 ( 0 .0 7 9 ) 0 .5 2 5 ( 0 .7 0 5 ) 1 .1 4 0 ( 0 .2 3 3 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 1 .9 9 - 0 .9 9
1 9 0 .2 1 3 0 .4 6 2 0 .3 2 5 0 .2 9 5 ( 0 .1 9 4 ) 0 .5 5 2 ( 0 .1 4 4 ) 0 .1 5 3 ( 0 .1 9 4 ) - 0 .1 9 4 ( 1 .1 7 9 ) 1 .1 9 4 ( 0 .3 1 3 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 1 .1 6 0 .4 4
1 7 0 .2 4 0 0 .4 0 0 0 .3 6 1 0 .2 5 4 ( 0 .0 9 3 ) 0 .4 8 0 ( 0 .1 0 1 ) 0 .2 6 6 ( 0 .0 9 3 ) 0 .1 4 3 ( 0 .5 8 6 ) 1 .2 0 1 ( 0 .2 5 3 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 1 .8 7 - 1 .6 8
2 0 .1 0 4 0 .5 4 0 0 .3 5 6 0 .2 1 1 ( 0 .3 1 2 ) 0 .6 7 8 ( 0 .1 7 8 ) 0 .1 1 1 ( 0 .3 1 2 ) - 0 .7 6 3 ( 2 .9 9 5 ) 1 .2 5 6 ( 0 .3 2 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 2 .1 1 0 .2 7
1 0 0 .2 0 6 0 .4 1 0 0 .3 8 4 - 0 .1 0 9 ( 0 .2 7 5 ) 0 .5 7 5 ( 0 .1 9 8 ) 0 .5 3 4 ( 0 .2 7 5 ) 1 .9 3 2 ( 1 .7 0 2 ) 1 .4 0 3 ( 0 .4 8 2 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 2 .4 7 0 .3 3
1 5 0 .2 0 5 0 .4 6 0 0 .3 3 6 0 .5 3 5 ( 0 .5 5 7 ) 0 .6 6 7 ( 0 .2 2 8 ) - 0 .2 0 2 ( 0 .5 5 7 ) - 1 .1 6 4 ( 2 .3 6 4 ) 1 .4 5 1 ( 0 .4 9 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 2 .0 3 1 .1 4
Regime R = IC-EB [20% of industries, 53% of rms]
Ind. j (N )j (M )j (K )j (b"QN )j (b"QM )j (b"QK )j b j bj bj bj Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
1 0 .1 4 9 0 .5 1 9 0 .3 3 2 0 .0 9 1 ( 0 .0 4 6 ) 0 .6 9 8 ( 0 .0 5 1 ) 0 .2 1 0 ( 0 .0 5 2 ) 0 .7 3 2 ( 0 .3 6 3 ) 1 .3 4 6 ( 0 .0 9 9 ) 0 .2 4 5 ( 0 .1 1 1 ) 0 .1 9 7 ( 0 .0 7 1 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .8 0 1 0 .4 8 6 - 9 .1 6 - 0 .6 3
1 6 0 .2 0 7 0 .4 7 3 0 .3 2 0 0 .1 2 3 ( 0 .0 7 3 ) 0 .6 9 0 ( 0 .0 7 2 ) 0 .1 8 7 ( 0 .0 7 0 ) 0 .8 6 7 ( 0 .4 5 4 ) 1 .4 6 0 ( 0 .1 5 2 ) 0 .3 8 5 ( 0 .1 7 3 ) 0 .2 7 8 ( 0 .0 9 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 0 0 .4 3 5 0 .7 3 1 - 4 .7 1 - 0 .3 9
8 0 .2 1 2 0 .4 9 7 0 .2 9 1 0 .1 4 5 ( 0 .0 5 3 ) 0 .8 0 9 ( 0 .0 5 8 ) 0 .0 4 5 ( 0 .0 5 8 ) 0 .9 4 2 ( 0 .3 2 2 ) 1 .6 2 7 ( 0 .1 1 6 ) 0 .4 2 1 ( 0 .1 2 4 ) 0 .2 9 6 ( 0 .0 6 1 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .9 0 9 0 .9 9 8 1 .0 0 0 1 .0 0 0 - 4 .1 2 - 1 .2 7
5 0 .1 9 9 0 .4 6 2 0 .3 3 9 0 .0 7 0 ( 0 .1 1 8 ) 0 .7 5 7 ( 0 .0 8 6 ) 0 .1 7 4 ( 0 .0 5 7 ) 1 .2 8 8 ( 0 .7 6 3 ) 1 .6 3 8 ( 0 .1 8 6 ) 0 .4 6 1 ( 0 .2 2 5 ) 0 .3 1 5 ( 0 .1 0 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .2 0 6 0 .0 4 1 0 .8 0 1 0 .9 4 8 - 4 .2 7 0 .0 7
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Table A.3 (ctd): Industry-specic input shares (J )j (J = N;M;K), output elasticities
b"QJ j , joint market imperfections parameter b j ,
and corresponding price-cost mark-up bj and absolute extent of rent sharing bj by country
FRANCE
Regime R = IC-EB [60% of industries, 73% of rms]
Ind. j (N )j (M )j (K )j (b"QN )j (b"QM )j (b"QK )j b j bj bj bj Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
1 3 0 .2 7 1 0 .5 6 3 0 .3 2 3 0 .2 4 2 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) 0 .7 3 3 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) 0 .0 2 5 ( 0 .0 1 7 ) 0 .4 0 8 ( 0 .1 3 0 ) 1 .3 0 3 ( 0 .0 4 4 ) 0 .5 0 9 ( 0 .1 4 7 ) 0 .3 3 7 ( 0 .1 3 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 2 0 .1 3 9 - 1 0 .3 0 - 2 .1 9
8 0 .3 1 5 0 .5 3 5 0 .3 6 2 0 .3 0 5 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .7 1 9 ( 0 .0 3 8 ) - 0 .0 2 3 ( 0 .0 2 8 ) 0 .3 7 6 ( 0 .2 0 2 ) 1 .3 4 3 ( 0 .0 7 0 ) 0 .5 8 7 ( 0 .2 8 8 ) 0 .3 7 0 ( 0 .2 0 2 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 1 4 0 .2 4 3 - 9 .2 6 - 2 .8 3
1 1 0 .2 3 3 0 .5 6 2 0 .3 0 6 0 .1 4 5 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .7 2 7 ( 0 .0 3 8 ) 0 .1 2 8 ( 0 .0 3 6 ) 0 .6 7 4 ( 0 .2 1 8 ) 1 .2 9 3 ( 0 .0 6 8 ) 0 .5 9 5 ( 0 .1 7 0 ) 0 .3 7 3 ( 0 .2 1 8 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 1 0 .4 1 5 - 7 .9 1 - 2 .7 3
7 0 .2 5 8 0 .5 5 1 0 .2 6 3 0 .1 9 2 ( 0 .0 2 8 ) 0 .7 9 0 ( 0 .0 2 3 ) 0 .0 1 8 ( 0 .0 2 3 ) 0 .6 8 8 ( 0 .1 3 6 ) 1 .4 3 3 ( 0 .0 4 1 ) 0 .6 4 9 ( 0 .1 1 5 ) 0 .3 9 4 ( 0 .1 3 6 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 2 2 0 .2 1 3 - 9 .4 8 0 .3 0
1 8 0 .3 3 0 0 .5 0 0 0 .3 5 0 0 .3 1 4 ( 0 .0 4 3 ) 0 .7 3 5 ( 0 .0 3 7 ) - 0 .0 5 0 ( 0 .0 2 8 ) 0 .5 1 6 ( 0 .1 9 2 ) 1 .4 7 0 ( 0 .0 7 4 ) 0 .6 8 0 ( 0 .2 2 2 ) 0 .4 0 5 ( 0 .1 9 2 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 7 3 0 .9 3 2 - 8 .0 4 - 1 .1 7
1 0 0 .3 4 2 0 .5 0 0 0 .3 5 4 0 .3 0 4 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) 0 .6 7 3 ( 0 .0 2 4 ) 0 .0 2 4 ( 0 .0 1 5 ) 0 .4 5 8 ( 0 .1 1 5 ) 1 .3 4 6 ( 0 .0 4 7 ) 0 .7 3 5 ( 0 .1 6 1 ) 0 .4 2 4 ( 0 .1 1 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 2 0 - 9 .8 1 - 1 .5 8
1 6 0 .3 6 1 0 .4 7 3 0 .3 0 6 0 .3 1 7 ( 0 .0 1 6 ) 0 .6 4 7 ( 0 .0 1 5 ) 0 .0 3 6 ( 0 .0 1 1 ) 0 .4 8 8 ( 0 .0 7 2 ) 1 .3 6 7 ( 0 .0 3 2 ) 0 .7 7 8 ( 0 .0 9 9 ) 0 .4 3 8 ( 0 .0 7 2 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 - 2 0 .6 8 - 1 .8 7
1 5 0 .2 7 5 0 .5 5 1 0 .2 6 3 0 .1 8 6 ( 0 .0 2 8 ) 0 .7 6 6 ( 0 .0 3 1 ) 0 .0 4 9 ( 0 .0 3 1 ) 0 .7 1 5 ( 0 .1 3 3 ) 1 .3 8 9 ( 0 .0 5 6 ) 0 .8 1 6 ( 0 .1 3 0 ) 0 .4 4 9 ( 0 .1 3 3 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 2 0 0 .7 4 2 - 6 .6 0 - 1 .2 4
2 0 0 .3 5 3 0 .4 6 7 0 .3 5 0 0 .2 9 2 ( 0 .0 5 0 ) 0 .7 2 2 ( 0 .0 3 5 ) - 0 .0 1 5 ( 0 .0 4 1 ) 0 .7 1 8 ( 0 .1 9 5 ) 1 .5 4 6 ( 0 .0 7 4 ) 0 .9 1 4 ( 0 .2 1 4 ) 0 .4 7 8 ( 0 .1 9 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 4 5 0 .0 2 0 - 7 .0 4 0 .6 7
1 9 0 .2 9 7 0 .5 3 3 0 .3 5 4 0 .1 8 5 ( 0 .0 3 6 ) 0 .7 8 5 ( 0 .0 3 0 ) 0 .0 3 0 ( 0 .0 2 3 ) 0 .8 4 8 ( 0 .1 7 0 ) 1 .4 7 2 ( 0 .0 5 6 ) 1 .0 0 4 ( 0 .1 6 8 ) 0 .5 0 1 ( 0 .1 7 0 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 4 2 0 .3 2 5 - 7 .4 1 - 0 .3 6
1 7 0 .3 3 1 0 .5 2 6 0 .4 0 0 0 .2 4 0 ( 0 .0 3 8 ) 0 .7 1 1 ( 0 .0 3 1 ) 0 .0 4 9 ( 0 .0 2 7 ) 0 .6 2 9 ( 0 .1 6 1 ) 1 .3 5 3 ( 0 .0 5 9 ) 1 .0 7 7 ( 0 .2 3 6 ) 0 .5 1 9 ( 0 .1 6 1 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 1 8 0 .0 0 4 - 1 1 .5 4 1 .3 9
5 0 .4 4 1 0 .4 1 2 0 .3 1 8 0 .3 5 7 ( 0 .0 3 7 ) 0 .6 2 6 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) 0 .0 1 6 ( 0 .0 3 7 ) 0 .7 0 9 ( 0 .1 1 8 ) 1 .5 2 0 ( 0 .0 6 0 ) 1 .3 9 6 ( 0 .1 9 5 ) 0 .5 8 3 ( 0 .1 1 8 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .3 3 1 - 8 .2 3 - 2 .4 3
Regime R = IC-PR [40% of industries, 27% of rms]
Ind. j (N )j (M )j (K )j (b"QN )j (b"QM )j (b"QK )j b j bj Sargan Hansen Dif-Hansen
(lev)
Dif-
Hansen
(L2-dif )
Dif-
Hansen
(L3-dif )
m1 m2
1 0 .1 7 7 0 .6 5 2 0 .1 7 1 0 .2 4 4 ( 0 .0 4 0 ) 0 .7 4 8 ( 0 .0 3 5 ) 0 .0 0 8 ( 0 .0 2 7 ) - 0 .2 3 0 ( 0 .2 6 6 ) 1 .1 4 8 ( 0 .0 5 4 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 8 0 .5 2 0 - 6 .7 3 - 2 .3 2
3 0 .1 8 0 0 .6 0 3 0 .2 1 8 0 .1 7 1 ( 0 .0 8 1 ) 0 .7 4 3 ( 0 .0 7 2 ) 0 .0 8 5 ( 0 .0 5 1 ) 0 .2 8 1 ( 0 5 5 0 ) 1 .2 3 4 ( 0 .1 1 9 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 3 5 0 .1 8 9 0 .2 3 6 0 .4 1 3 - 3 .8 4 - 0 .9 4
9 0 .2 3 9 0 .5 4 5 0 .2 1 5 0 .2 7 5 ( 0 .0 4 5 ) 0 .6 8 5 ( 0 .0 6 6 ) 0 .0 4 1 ( 0 .0 3 0 ) 0 .1 0 8 ( 0 .3 0 2 ) 1 .2 5 5 ( 0 .1 2 1 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 2 0 .1 2 8 - 5 .8 8 - 1 .7 7
1 2 0 .3 2 1 0 .5 0 1 0 .1 7 8 0 .3 6 0 ( 0 .0 6 9 ) 0 .6 3 6 ( 0 .0 5 8 ) 0 .0 0 4 ( 0 .0 5 3 ) 0 .1 4 7 ( 0 .3 0 4 ) 1 .2 6 9 ( 0 .1 1 6 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 4 5 0 .0 5 0 0 .1 7 6 0 .4 5 9 - 3 .9 0 - 1 .7 0
2 0 .2 9 2 0 .5 3 5 0 .1 7 3 0 .2 0 7 ( 0 .0 2 0 ) 0 .7 1 8 ( 0 .0 2 3 ) 0 .0 7 5 ( 0 .0 2 1 ) 0 .6 3 3 ( 0 .1 0 0 ) 1 .3 4 3 ( 0 .0 4 4 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 5 7 - 6 .2 5 - 1 .3 1
6 0 .3 4 4 0 .4 7 9 0 .1 7 7 0 .2 8 9 ( 0 .0 5 2 ) 0 .6 6 2 ( 0 .0 5 9 ) 0 .0 4 9 ( 0 .0 4 6 ) 0 .5 4 3 ( 0 .2 5 2 ) 1 .3 8 3 ( 0 .1 2 4 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 7 1 0 .4 0 9 - 5 .0 8 - 0 .0 1
4 0 .3 3 0 0 .5 1 1 0 .1 5 9 0 .2 3 1 ( 0 .0 3 6 ) 0 .7 5 2 ( 0 .0 3 0 ) 0 .0 1 7 ( 0 .0 3 1 ) 0 .7 6 8 ( 0 .1 5 0 ) 1 .4 7 0 ( 0 .0 5 8 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 2 0 .5 1 9 - 8 .1 5 - 0 .9 5
1 4 0 .2 9 6 0 .4 9 5 0 .2 0 9 0 .1 5 2 ( 0 .0 3 7 ) 0 .7 7 4 ( 0 .0 3 2 ) 0 .0 7 4 ( 0 .0 2 5 ) 1 .0 5 0 ( 0 .1 7 8 ) 1 .5 6 3 ( 0 .0 6 5 ) 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 .1 2 4 - 8 .4 2 - 1 .5 3
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time dummies are included but not reported. Sargan, Hansen, Dif -Hansen: tests of overidentifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as
2df . p-values are reported. Dif -Hansen (lev) tests the validity of the 1-year lag of the rst-di¤erenced inputs as instruments in the levels equation while Dif -Hansen (L2-dif)/(L3-dif) test
the validity of the 2-/3-year lags of the inputs as instruments in the rst-di¤erenced equation. m1 and m2: tests for rst-order and second-order serial correlation in the rst-di¤erenced residuals,
asymptotically distributed as N(0; 1). Industries within R = PC-PR and R = IC-PR are ranked according to bj , industries within R = IC-EB are ranked according to bj .
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Table A.4: Correlations between estimates of product and labor market imperfections by country
bj ;bj bj ;bj
CHILE
All industries 0.657 [0.679] 0.589 [0.682]
R = IC-EB 1.000 [0.481]
FRANCE
All industries 0.826 [0.801] 0.714 [0.839]
R = IC-EB 0.685 [0.766]
Notes: Rank correlation is reported. A robust correlation is reported in square brackets.
Signicant at 1%, Signicant at 5%, Signicant at 10%.
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